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AN ANSWER TO PROFESSOR PIERCE: How UTILITY
REGULATION CAN BE REFORMED IN HARMONY WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
RICHARD McKENNA AND
WARD W. WUESTE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

A thoughtful essay by Professor Richard Pierce of Columbia University
addresses the role the federal judiciary should play with respect to public utility
regulation His essay identifies grave problems that have arisen in this field and
suggests fresh approaches to these problems. Although the authors disagree in
significant ways with Professor Pierce's reading of the present state of the law,
his review of the shortcomings of the utility rate-regulation process as it now
exists, and his suggestion that reform of this process is urgently required, is
commendable.2
Professor Pierce visualizes a world where public utility regulation-with the
deficiencies characteristic of the process-would be replaced by the discipline of
a competitive market. This would indeed be a vast improvement. Moreover, in
the field of telecommunications, federal and state regulators are beginning to
understand that the reality of competition is making the cumbersome and costly
burdens of regulation obsolete. For example, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California ("California commission") are each proceeding with innovative plans
designed to minimize the shortcomings of conventional public utility regulation.

*
The authors represent the GTE telephone companies before federal and state regulatory
agencies and courts.

1.

Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police Political

Intiutions?,77 GEO. LJ.2031 (1989). See infra Postscript for a brief synopsis of Professor Pierce's
article and his response to the points raised in this Article.

2.

Professor Pierce recommends a proposal for "a new system of reliance upon competitive

bidding, combined with contracts resulting from bidding, as the basis for new capacity decisions and
the rate consequences of those decisions." Pierce, supra note 1, at 2072. By this means,

"[c]ompetitive markets and judicially enforceable contracts ultimately will replace politically opportunistic state regulation as the primary mechanism for ensuring 'just and reasonable' rates for electricity
and efficient conduct by the firms of the industry." Id

3.

For the FCC plan, seePolicyandRulesConcerningRatesforDominantCarierr, CC Docket

No. 87-313, consisting of Notice ofProposedRule Making, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5208 (1987); FurtherNotice

ofProposedRuleaking,3 F.C.C. Rd. 3195 (1988) ("FurtherNotice); Report and Order and Second
FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 4 F.C.C. Rd. 2873 (1989), with 4 F.C.C. Rd. 3379 (1989)

CReport & Order"); Supplemental Notice of ProposedRulemaking, No. 87-313 (F.C.C., adopted Mar.
8,1990, as corrected Mar. 23,1990, second correction Mar. 14,1990) (LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC
file). The plan was adopted in SecondReport andOrder,No. 87-313 (F.C.C., adopted Sept. 19,1990)

(LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC fie).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 1, Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The FCC and California commission plans are designed to operate in harmony
with the constitutional principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in landmark cases dealing with utility regulation.4 This harmony contrasts with
Professor Pierce's paradoxical approach, which stresses the reality of confiscatory
regulation and its destructive effects, while at the same time insisting that utility

investors should be denied effective constitutional protection.
As long as public utilities are rate-regulated, the Constitution requires fair and
workable rules of the game to prevent the immensely destructive effects of
confiscatory regulation described in Professor Pierce's article. This Article
demonstrates that the constitutional doctrine reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in the 1989 Duquesne Light case, and recently applied by the District of
Columbia Circuit,5 is entirely consistent with a more innovative approach to
regulation in the public interest.
Section I of this Article summarizes Professor Pierce's excellent description of
the confiscation problem that is afflicting the electric power industry in
connection with canceled nuclear power plants. In Sections II, III, and IV, this
Article discusses how to prevent confiscation by timely and effective application
of keystone utility regulation principles, and stresses the interrelationship
between those principles and the influence of the capital markets. Finally, in
Section V, this Article reviews the innovative plans being implemented by the
FCC and the California commission, with emphasis on their respect for
constitutional principles.
I. POLITICAL PRESSURES ON REGULATORS AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM

Professor Pierce describes a very grave crisis involving the electric utilities in
For the California commission plan, see Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange
Carriers, Interim Opinion on Phase II of 1.87-11-033, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (1989)
C'CaliforniaInterim Opinion'), reh'g denied, Decision 90-04-031, Apr. 11, 1990, appealpending sub
nom. Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Public Utilities Comm'n, No. S015626 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed
May 17, 1990). Innovative plans are being considered or implemented in nearly every state.
4.
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of West Virginia,
262 U.S. 679 (1923) C'Bluefield'); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) C'Hope); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989) C"Duquesne Light').
The guiding principle since 1896, according to the Duquesne Light Court, has been that "the
Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public
which is so 'unjust' as to be confiscatory." DuquesneLigh4 109 S. Ct. at 615. The focus of judicial
review is not on methodology but on the end result of regulatory actions. "Ie Constitution protects
the utility from the net effect of the rate order on its property." Idt at 619. This protection, grounded
in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is made applicable to state or local
regulation by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "If the rate does not
afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use of utility property without pa)ing just
compensation and so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." led at 616. See also infra note
51; McKenna, The Special ConstitutionalStatus of Public UtilityRegulation: From Munn to Duquerne
Light, 21 U. WEsr LA. L REV. 31 (1990).
5.
See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 810 F.2d
1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) CJersey Central);American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1386
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam), conditionalapplicationfor review en banc denied, No. 85-1778. slip op.
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 1988) ("AT&T).
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the United States. Since 1984, state agencies have repeatedly denied these
utilities the opportunity to recover tens of billions of dollars invested in nuclear
generating plants. A number of commentators "see this unprecedented pattern
of decisions as evidence of a severe political malfunction in the ratemaking
process."6 After relatively light regulation for many years starting in 1966,
"[e]xogenous factors caused utilities' costs to increase."7 Then regulators
"responded to the resulting requests for rate increases by beginning to constrain
utility rates of return."s As a result, "[e]arned and allowed rates of return
declined during the period 1966-69, even though utilities' cost of capital
increased during that period."9 Finding this pattern "inconsistent with a legal
or economic explanation of the regulatory process and consistent with a political
explanation," Professor Pierce suggests that the electrics became "easy and safe
targets for opportunistic behavior by the majority and for exploitation by
politicians" because: "[a]nxiety and anger over rising utility rates made it easy
for politicians and the media to communicate with the majority by using simple
symbols, e.g., rising rates and greedy utilities. This activated the previously
docile and uninformed majority." 0
A breakdown of the system followed. "The major increases in utility costs that
began in 1969 caused the process to break down completely, with utilities
systematically earning rates of return below their cost of capital."'
Placing heavy reliance on a study by Paul JoskowU Professor Pierce concludes that state commissions, in rejecting requested rate increases, have denied
electrics recovery of tens of billions of dollars in costs.1 This situation arose
because politicians "seize[d] the opportunity to curry favor with the majority by
using their raw political power over the ratemaking process to redistribute
wealth from the discrete, insular, and immutable minority [investors] to the
majority [ratepayers]."' 4 Finding "inherently implausible" the "trends and
relationships implied by the aggregate data available from the regulatory actions
disallowing investments as imprudent," Professor Pierce consequently finds it
"easy to conclude that utility regulation in the 1980s is afflicted by the political
malfunction [James] Madison feared most-majoritarian bias based on unequal
distributions of property. " 5

"In constitutional law terms," Professor Pierce states, "the inference seems

6.
Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046.
7.
Id at 2048.
8.
Id
9.
Id
10. Id at 2048-49.
11. Id at 2049.
12. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: StructuralChange in the Process of Public
Utility Pce Regulation, 17 J. LAw & EcoN. 291 (1974).
13. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2048-50.
14. Id at 2049.
15. Id at 2051.
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inescapable that, on an aggregate basis, state governments are 'taking' billions
of dollars worth of property through the regulatory process." 6 Many analysts
who have studied the effects of the electric utility rate decisions of the 1980s
recognize the grave consequences of this confiscatory regulation. They have
reached the alarming conclusion that this opportunistic behavior "has so
distorted utility decisions to invest in new plants that the United States is
virtually certain to face some combination of blackouts, brownouts, and
unnecessarily high electricity rates sometime in the 1990s."17 Consequently,
electric utilities "with a demonstrated need for new capacity either will not make
any investments in capacity or will invest in low regulatory risk, high operating
cost capacity. " '
Without judicial intervention or a major change in the method of regulating
utilities, Professor Pierce maintains, "it appears the nation will suffer scores of
billions of dollars in unnecessary future costs because of current state regulatory
takings from utilities."19 Viewing "the political process of ratemaking" as
"afflicted with the severe political malfunction of majoritarian bias," Professor
Pierce explains that "[t]his manifestation of factionalism has already resulted in
redistribution of billions of dollars through the exercise of raw politicallower,
and it places the nation's future supply of electricity in grave jeopardy." "Yet
the courts," he suggests, "appear institutionally
incapable of correcting this
21
political malfunction at tolerable cost"
Furthermore, he views "the political process of ratemaking [as] a dismal
picture of seemingly perpetual Hobbesian behavior" where state agencies
"fluctuate from dominance by minoritarian factions to dominance by majoritarian
factions, using their political power to redistribute wealth among factions in an
opportunistic manner that creates a negative sum game for society."22 He
concludes that, at the state level, "intense majoritarian pressure on [the] political
actors forces them to behave opportunistically."3 And he suggests "that no
effort by the Supreme Court to reenter the ratemaking process under the takings
clause is likely to have any real effect on the political actors who control
ratemaking on the state level unless the Court is willing to impose strong judicial
constraints...." 24 Notwithstanding this conclusion, Professor Pierce argues
against such "strong judicial constraints" and for innovative approaches to regul-

16. Ia.
at 2051-52.
17. Id at 2052.
18. Id at 2052-53.
19. Id at 2053.
20. Id
21. Id.
22. rd Professor Pierce states that he does not mean to suggest that state regulators ignore
entirely the merits of rate cases. "Rather, I believe that the political environment in which they
operate imposes on them pressures and constraints so powerful that it is impossible for them to
decide cases ina detached, objective manner." Id at 2070 n.211.
23. Id at 2071.
24. Id at 2070.
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ation unsupported by actively enforced constitutional doctrine.S
I1. PREVENTING CONFISCATORY REGULATION
Professor Pierce's description of a highly politicized regulatory environment is
well taken. Anyone who has worked in the field of regulation is aware of how
destructive this kind of environment can be. However, Professor Pierce's views
must be considered in light of public utility regulation as a whole, taking into
account both its successes and its failures.
A

The entirepicture ofpublic utility regulation in the United States is not as
dismal as suggested by ProfessorPierce'sdiscussion.

Professor Pierce's article focuses on the problems associated with canceled
nuclear power plants. As important as this is, regulation of nuclear power plants
does not reflect the totality of public utility regulation. The fact is that a wide
variety of public utilities appear to be operating on a stable basis. Furthermore,
the electric industry as a whole seems to be financially healthy notwithstanding
the effects of plant cancellations.? 6 Moreover, there are encouraging signs,
particularly in telecommunications, that enlightened federal and state regulators
are willing to make rational adjustments to a rapidly changing environmentY
Central to all applications of utility regulation is the very real problem stressed
by Professor Pierce: How to provide regulation which serves the public interest
when surrounded by a politicized environment. Universalizing the power plant
controversy and its grim consequences does not provide a complete and balanced
picture.
B. Even without active involvement of the federaljudiciary,the Bluefield/Hope
principleshave been an important influence
Stressing the inactivity of the federal judiciary in applying the constitutional
principles established by the Bluefield and Hope cases, Professor Pierce implies
that these principles have had no real impactss However, as Professor Drobak

25.
26.

See supra notes 2 & 4.
See eg., Standard & Poor, CREDrr Rav.: ELEemc & GAS UTIL. 4-18 (May 11, 1990);

Standard & Poor, CREDrr REv.: TELECOM. 4-12 (June 4,1990). But see Professor Pierces Comments,
infra p. 104.

27.

For example, many important and difficult adjustments have been implemented to reflect

technological changes and the entirely new environment that followed the breakup of the Bell System.

See NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985) (where the
court approved in principle the FCC's access charge plan).
28. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046. See also Bluefield, 262 U.S. 679; Hope 320 U.S. 591.
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points out,2 thousands of rate decisions by state courts and by state or federal
agencies since Hope have cited these cases and applied their principles. This
does not minimize the gravity of the political failures highlighted by Professor
Pierce; but to assume the universality of those failures paints too bleak a picture.
C. The massive failure of regulation described by ProfessorPierce logically
justifies increasedjudicial scrutiny ratherthan the elimination of effective
constitutionalprotection.
Professor Pierce demonstrates that political pressures on state regulatory
agencies have resulted in large scale confiscatory regulation, with immensely
destructive consequences. 30 This suggests the need for more effective enforcement of the constitutional principles reaffirmed by DuquesneLight-in particular,
the need for a more active role on the part of the federal judiciary. Professor
Pierce, however, appears to be insisting that any enforcement effort would
necessarily be unsuccessful. 31 His paradoxical position relies on a pattern of
confiscatory action to justify abandonment of actively enforced constitutional
safeguards."
The authors maintain that Professor Pierce's conclusion-that an increased risk
of confiscatory regulation justifies diminished constitutional protection-conflicts
with the very experience upon which he places so much emphasis. As discussed
below, this untenable conclusion arises from: (i) his refusal to accept the
Supreme Court's clear and simple articulation of the relevant law, and (ii) his
failure to recognize the key role played by the capital markets.
III. THE CLEAR AND DEFINITE PRINCIPLES OF BLUEFIELD, HOPE, AND
DUQUESNE LIGHT

Professor Pierce's article subordinates the Supreme Court's clear articulation
of constitutional principles in Hope and Bluefield to an assumed, but unproven,

29. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The ConstitutionalLimits on Utility Rate
Regulation, 65 B.U.L REV.65 (1985). Referring to the "stringent protection" generally understood
to apply to utility ratemaking, Professor Drobak says: "Hundreds, probably thousands, of judicial and
administrative decisions, both state and federal, rendered during the past forty years" explain the law
since Hope as holding "that the Constitution requires rates to be set at levels high enough to generate
moderate profits for investors." Ma at 65-66.
30. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046-50.
31. Id at 2070.
32. See Postscript, infra pp. 103-04, where Professor Pierce clarifies his views:
[As for] your characterization of my position... as "insisting" utility investors be denied
constitutional protection ...[this] characterization is not inaccurate, but I hoped to
convey more a flavor of reluctant acquiescence in the extremely limited ability of the
courts to perform this theoretically desirable function.
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sub rosa doctrine that public utilities must be left at the mercy of regulation. 3
Thus, Professor Pierce refers to the Hope principles and their application in such
recent decisions as Jersey CentralPower & Light Co. v.FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission3 4 and American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. FederalCommunications Commission,35 as if they were a new proposal rather than forty-five year
old doctrine reaffirmed in 1989.3
Failure of the federal judiciary in the past to apply established constitutional
doctrine in a consistent manner does not justify Professor Pierce's implication
that the doctrine does not really exist. His article stresses the courts' finite
capacity to deal with cases and controversies, and that choices must be made
about where their resources should be invested to achieve the most beneficial
results.37 Regrettably, these factors have resulted in neglect of utility matters
over the past several decades. As Professor Pierce's article demonstrates, the
price of this neglect is now being paid.3 However, the judiciary's past neglect
does not justify the conclusion that the Supreme Court's careful articulation of
constitutional doctrine can be disregarded. Any doubts as to where the Court
stands were resolved inDuquesneLight,where the Court explicitly reaffirmed the
Bluefield/Hope constitutional standard.
Professor Pierce, who found Hope ambiguous, similarly finds Duquesne Light
ambiguous. 39 The following discussion of the case law shows that there is not
ambiguity, but rather a clear and consistent standard under which the essential
benchmark for constitutional purposes is the utility firm's continuing ability to
access the capital markets.
Judge Bork's opinion for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
sitting en banc in the Jersey Centralcase neatly summarized the case law. Courts
reviewing rate orders "must determine whether or not the end result of that
order constitutes a reasonable balancing, based on factual findings, of the
investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to capital markets
and the consumer interest in being charged non-exploitative rates."40

33.

"IThe 'end result' test announced in Hope can be seen as a decision to allocate to the

political institutions of government near total power. ..

."

34.
35.

Jersey Centra4 810 F.2d 1168.
AT&T, 836 F.2d 1386.

36.
37.
38.

Pierce, supra note 1, at 2036-39.
Id at 2040-47.
See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.

Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046.

39. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2036.
40. Jersey Centra; 810 F.2d at 1177-78. For an authoritative review of the cases that, over a
hundred year period, established and applied the constitutional standard, see Pond, The Law
Governingthe Fidng of Public Utiliy Rates: A Response to Recent JudicialandAcademic Misconcepdons, 41 ADmIN. L REv. 1 (1989). Pond's article is in sharp disagreement on many points made by
Drobak. See supra note 29.

Referring ominously to "constitutionally-based micromanagement of utility ratemaking," Pierce,

supranote 1, at 2036, Professor Pierce's article recounts the rationale of the Jersey Centralcourt not

as settled doctrine, but as some alien concept being proposed for the first
time. Id at 2036-39. The
fact is that Jersey Centralsimply applied the end result test and remanded the agency's decision on
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Judge Bork's words indicate the critical focus for constitutional purposes is
access to the capital markets. This was made clear in the 1923 Bluefield case,
which stated that a public utility is entitled to charge rates that will permit the
company "to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the
convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business
undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties....
This entitlement does not mean that government guarantees a return. It means
that government action will not deny the regulated firm the opportunity to earn
a return that is "reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility," and therefore "adequate, under efficient and economical
it to raise
management, to maintain and support [the flrm's] credit and enable
"42
the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.
Similarly, the 1944 Hope case, which emphasized the "end result" character of
the constitutional test, focused on ensuring that the firm could maintain its

that basis. The careful review of constitutional principles by Judge Bork in his opinion for the en bane
court, 810 F.2d at 1175-82, was not challenged by the dissent, id. at 1194-1215, which focused on
important procedural aspects of the case.
The court's holding stressed the overarching character of the end result test. The test is conoerned
with the aggregate result of agency action, i.e., "whether the component decisions together produce
just and reasonable consequences." Id at 1179. An order "cannot be justified simply by a showing
that each of the choices underlying it was reasonable; those choices must still add up to a reasonable
result' Ad at 1178. In rejecting an agency argument that'"beause excluding the unamortized portion
of a canceled plant investment from the rate base had previously been upheld aspermissible,any rate
order that rests on such a decision is unimpeachable," the D.C. Circuit reasoned that such a theory
"would turn our focus from the end result to the methodology, and evade the question of whether the
component decisions together produce just and reasonable consequences." I at 1179 (emphasis in
original).
Each component element in a rate order may be perfectly valid, but the Constitution is violated
if the total effect is confiscatory. "The fact that a particular ratemaking standard is generally
permissible does not per se legitimate the end result of the rate order it produces." Id, at 1180
(referring to Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, reh'gdenied, 392 U.S. 917 (1968)). "In
examining the end result of the rate order, [PermianBasin] made clear, a court cannot affirm simply
because each of the component decisions of that order, taken in isolation, was permissible; it must
be the case 'that they do not together produce arbitrary or unreasonable consequences.'" Jersey Central,
810 F.2d at 1177 (emphasis added) (quoting PermianBasin, 390 U.S. at 800).
Similarly, whileAT&T is an important decision, it propounds no new constitutional principles. In
AT&T the D.C. Circuit struck down a refund plan developed by the FCC because the plan was
internally inconsistent. The parameters and acknowledged effect of the plan itself would make it
impossible for a carrier to earn the minimal rate of return prescribed by the agency. The basis for
theAT&Tcourt's ruling did not directly implicate constitutional questions. The court found the FCC's
refund rule to be arbitrary and capricious and therefore in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). AT&T, 836 F.2d at 1389. Then the court took the unusual step
of providing the agency with "guidance" in case it should choose to reformulate its refund rule. Citing
Hope, 320 U.S. at 602, the court said that the FCC "should explain how [a refund mechanism] that
would result in pushing the carriers' total return below a reasonable level would be consistent with
the constitutional doctrine that an agency rate order 'viewed in its entirety' must produce a just and
reasonable 'total effect' on the regulated business' AT&T, 836 F.2d at 1391-92.
Although referred to by Professor Pierce as "revolutionary decisions", Pierce, supra note 1, at 2039,
Jersey Central and AT&T are merely applications of long-standing doctrine.
41. Bluefiel4 262 U.S. at 692.
42. Id at 693.
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credit and attract capital43 The Hope Court stated that the "return to the
equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks;" and such return "should be sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain
its credit and to attract capital...."44
DuquesneLight explicitly reaffirms this doctrine. Nonetheless, Professor Pierce
insists this 1989 decision of the Supreme Court is "ambiguous."45 In fact, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Opinion for the Court 46 simply restates the constitutional
rules underlying Bluefleld and Hope. "The Constitution," according to the
DuquesneLight Court, "protects the utility from the net effect of the rate order
on its property."47 The Court points out this principle dates back to Covington
& Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sanford, decided in 1896.4 Since then, "[t]he
guiding principle has been that the Constitution protects utilities from being
limited to a charge for their property serving the public which is so 'unjust' as
to be confiscatory." 49 Implicitly sweeping away any claim that this doctrine is
a matter of substantive due process,50 the Duquesne Light Court explains the
constitutional basis for the doctrine is the fourteenth amendment (Due Process
Clause) and the fifth amendment (Just Compensation Clause).51 "If the rate
does not afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use of utility
property without paying just compensation and so violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.5 2
As stressed by Duquesne Light, the Hope case sets out clear and definite
constitutional principles that must be respected by federal, state, and local
government. Yet Professor Pierce finds Hope "at best" ambiguous.53 He
recognizes that the Hope Court "did not announce that utility ratemaking was

43.

'Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the

method employed which is controlling." Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 (citations omitted). The statutory

standard reflected in the phrase 'Just and reasonable" has been held to coincide with the constitutional
standard. See PennianBasin, 390 U.S. at 770; Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
of America, 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) C'Natural Gas Ppeline').
44. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603 (citations omitted).
45. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2036.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Only Justice Blackmun dissented, on procedural grounds.
Duquesne Ligh4 109 S. Ct. at 619.
Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
DuquesneLigh4 109 S.Ct. at 615.

50.

See McKenna, supra note 4.

51. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "[Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897), the United States Supreme Court
established that the Just Compensation Clause binds state and local government byvirtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
52. DuquesneLigh4 109 S.Ct. at 616. Compliance with the BluefieldlHope standard was not
an issue before the Duquesne Light Court. See id at 618. Absent a constitutional dimension, the
Court would not be drawn into the merits of the "used and useful" issue that was before the Court.

53.

Pierce, supra note 1, at 2031.
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unconstrained by the takings [Just Compensation] clause" but "purported merely
to substitute one constitutional test for another."5 4 Nonetheless, Professor
Pierce's article maintains that Hope's end result test "can be seen as a decision
to allocate to the political institutions of government near total power to protect
values underlying the takings clause in the ratemaking
the constitutional
55
context."
The Hope case does not speak of "near total power" and it has not been viewed
this way by the Supreme Court. For example, Justice Douglas, the author of the
Hope opinion, wrote an Opinion for the Court in the 1945 ColoradoInterstate5 6
case that insisted the Hope test "is not a standard so vague and devoid of
meaning as to render judicial review a perfunctory process [but is] a standard of
finance resting on stubborn facts."57
There is special significance in the above-quoted words of Justice Douglas
because of the key role he played in establishing the ground rules under which
agencies and courts have operated since 1944. The Hope decision emerged after
several years of controversy among the Justices as to the impact on rate
regulation of the Court's post-1937 philosophy5 8 Justices Black, Murphy, and
Douglas argued unsuccessfully in the 1942 Natural Gas Pipeline59 case that rate
regulation of public utilities should be subject to the same judicial deference as
other forms of regulation.60 The outcome in 1944 was two decisions written by
Justice Douglas: Hope, decided January 3, 1944; and, a few weeks later, Bowles
v. Willingham,6' which made non-utility rate regulation, i.e. rent control, a
subject of virtually complete judicial deference. 62 Citing Hope, the Bowles
Court carefully distinguished non-utility regulation from "other price-fixing
statutes [where] Congress has provided for the fixing of rates which are just and
reasonable in their application to particular persons or companies." 63 Bowles
stressed (i) the issue involved federal government action under the War Power,
and (ii) the operative federal statute did not implicate a taking issue under the
Just Compensation Clause because that statute did not impose a "requirement
that the apartments in question be used for purposes which bring them under
54.
55.
56.
Interstatde.

I
IcL at 2046.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) C'Colorado
See also Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 829-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Jersey Central, 810

F.2d at 1179 (rejecting an agency claim that the Hope standard is merely a limitation on judicial
review).
57. Colorado Interstate,324 U.S. at 605 (footnote omitted).
58. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) C'Carolene
Products'); Oakes, "PropertyRights" in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REv. 583 (1981);
H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COUR. CtIIL RIGHS AND LIBERTIES INTHE UNIED STATES 8-27
(4th ed. 1982).
59. See supra note 43.
60. See NaturalGas Pipeline,315 U.S. at 599-608 (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., concurring).
61. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (argued within a week of the Hope decision and
decided at the end of March 1944) ('Bowles").

62.
63.

I1 at 516-18.
Id at 517.
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the Act." 4 In contrast, the Hope Court (i) put aside the 1942 argument of
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy that public utility regulation should be
subject to the same judicial deference as other forms of rate regulation, and (ii)
set out a coterminous statutory and constitutional standard that has been
interpreted as such, and applied by innumerable agency and court decisions since
then-f'

Professor Pierce erroneously speaks of Hope as if it were Bowles-an allocation
"to the political institutions of government [of] near total power...."66
Further, he insists the Court "implicitly reaffirmed its decision to allocate near
total control over ratemaking to political institutions by refusing to hear any
state ratemaking case under the takings clause from 1944 until 1986." 67
As to the relative inactivity of the federal judiciary in the decades following
Hope, Professor Pierces own article provides a plausible explanation that does
not require us to reach for a speculative sub rosa doctrine. It "is fair to draw the
inference that the Court saw no political malfunction in the ratemaking process
so severe that it justified the significant commitment of judicial resources that
its experience from 1898 to 1944 had shown was necessary to constrain the

process.""
Indeed, the Supreme Court over the past several decades may have simply
preferred to expend its resources elsewhere. The Court may have believed that
the system of public utility regulation was operating reasonably well and did not
need closer scrutiny. Today, given the massive political failure described by
Professor Pierce, the Court is willing to take a closer look. This does not
indicate a change in doctrine, but rather a response by a different set of Justices
to a different environment. Nothing in Duquesne Light suggests that any of the
Justices believe a new doctrine has been articulated. Furthermore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion stresses the consistency of the doctrine since 1896.6

64.

I

at 513,517. The statute specified that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to require

any person to sell any commodity or to offer any accommodations for rent." Id at 517. In contrast,
public utilities are not entitled simply to abandon an unprofitable service. See Drobak, Constitutional
Limts on Price andRent Contro" The Lessons of Utilio Regulation, 64 WASH. U.LQ. 107, 110-11,
120 (1986).
65. See supra notes 29 & 43.

66.
67.

Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046.
Id

68. Id
69. In addition to Covington and Hope, the Court cites Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc.,
417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974). Duquesne Light 109 S.Ct. at 615-16.
The dramatic contrast between treatment, in constitutional terms, of public utility regulation and
non-utility regulation is clearly shown in two recent Opinions for the Court by Chief Justice
Rehnquist: (1) DuquesneLight and (2) Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (rent control).
Professor Drobak suggests the Court should decide that utility-type safeguards will apply to rent
control. See Drobak, supranote 64, at 138-39. A similar recommendation has been made by the coauthor of this Article. See McKenna, Paradon; Asymmety, and Switcheroos: Approaching
ConstitutionalLaw from an UnexpectedAngle 23 MARSHALL L Rsv. 333, 348-49 (1990).

Professor Drobak's article reviews at length the difference in treatment between Hope/Duquesne
Light and BowleslPennell, observing- "The Hope standards assure that adequate compensation ... is
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Nonetheless, arguing for a less active role of the federal judiciary, Professor
Pierce describes both Duquesne Light and Hope as ambiguous; and he counts
himself among "those who continue to interpret Hope as a signal of de facto
judicial retreat from constitutional review of ratemaking" rather than among
"those who find in Hope the seeds of a constitutional law doctrine that imposes
significant judicial
constraints on the political institutions controlling utility
7
ratemaking."
Far from being ambiguous, Duquesne Light's simple declarative sentences set
forth constitutional doctrine with admirable clarity. In explicit terms, the
Duquesne Light Court presents the Hope principle as "a constitutional. law
doctrine that imposes significant judicial constraints on the political institutions
controlling utility ratemaking." Surprisingly,
Professor Pierce does not even find
71
"the seeds" of such a doctrine in Hope.
Surely, when the Supreme Court sets forth principles specifically identified in
constitutional terms, the Justices intend courts, agencies, and practitioners to rely
on them. The Duquesne Light Court's language must be read for what it
purports to be: an explicit statement of essential principles grounded in the
Constitution-principles that must be respected by federal, state, and local
government.
IV. THE MUTUALLY REINFORCING EFFECTS OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Professor Pierce discusses at length the difficulties that would arise if the
federal courts actively applied the Bluefield/Hope standard.72 However, he gives
little or no weight to the critical role played by the operation of the capital
markets. 73 He implies the judicial process must carry the entire burden of
preventing confiscatory regulation. But experience indicates the constructive
influence of the capital markets can make the task of regulators and jurists more
manageable.
The dismal history of confiscatory action in matters involving nuclear power
plants recounted by Professor Pierce shows that a rational process of regulation
may be virtually precluded by an explosive political environment. This
experience has taught that the influence of the capital markets by itself cannot

provided through utility rates. On the other hand,... there is no requirement that price control
schemes satisfy the Hope standards or generate profits at all." Drobak, supra note 64, at 109-10.
Nonetheless, contrary arguments persist. See Darr, The ConstitutionalLimits on Rat nalzg. A
Response to William [Walter]Pond, 11 ENERGY LJ.53 (1990).
70. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2033.
71. Id Cf. cases cited supra note 4.
72. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2053-70.
73. See ag, Pierce, supra note 1, at 2062-63 & n.169. The passing references to the capital
markets in Professor Pierce's article do not recognize their constructive influence. A variety of firms
issue credit ratings for public utilities and also rate the impact of regulation in each jurisdiction.
These ratings, which are the stuff of day-to-day reporting in the news media, both reflect and
influence capital market reactions.
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be expected to withstand a popular tantrum that respects no rules. 74 But it
would be wrong to say this influence is not a factor at all. After all, our
government has close to a hundred years of experience with utility regulation.
This history shows that confiscatory action by government can be constrained by
a combination of two mutually-reinforcing elements: (i) timely and effective
constitutional enforcement, and (ii) the operation of the capital markets.
Indeed, the functioning of the capital markets is integral to the constitutional
standard. Just as the capital markets give weight to constitutional protection in
assessing risk, the constitutional standard focuses on ensuring that the public
utility firm will be able to meet its financing needs. As stressed in Section III
above, the standard mandates that government action not deny the regulated
firm the opportunity to earn a return that is "reasonably sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility," and is "adequate, under
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support [the firm's] credit
and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties."75 The allowed return "should be sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract
capital ... ,76
Putting it simply, if the risk and return associated with a utility investment is
not competitive with other options available to the capital markets, the flow of
investment funds stops. In order to restart that flow, the risk associated with the
investment and/or its return must be adjusted to make the investment more
competitive. This simple reality compels regulators to recognize that agency
actions such as holding rates below the level of cost (ostensibly to benefit the
public) will quickly prove self-defeating because, as the firm's cost of capital
increases, there will be upward pressure on rates.
For example, assume the capital markets perceive an increase in risk as a
result of the kind of regulatory action just described. This increased risk makes
investment in either the regulated firm's equity or its debt less attractive to the
investor. If the alternative investment options available to the investor continue
to be (at least) as attractive as they were, then this increase in risk should cause
the capital markets to decline investment in the firm without (i) a reduction in

74.

For court action curbing confiscatory tantrums, see Seawall Associates v. City of New

York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert denied, 110 S. CL 500 (1989) (hotel
property); Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247

(1989) (California's Proposition 103). See also McKenna, supra note 69, at 343 (rent control):
[I]n New York City... a very unamusing paradox was policy ostensibly adopted for the
benefit of the poor that eliminated housing that could accommodate the poor. The
consequences of confiscatory regulation are visible in dramatic form in the Bronx

Ruin-mile after mile of burned-out hulks and rubble where there once stood a thriving
city.
Id (footnotes omitted).
75. Bluefiel4 262 U.S. at 693.
76. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603 (citations omitted).
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risk and/or (ii) an improvement in the interest to be paid on debt or: the
anticipated return on equity shares. As the resulting increase in the firm's real
capital costs affects rates, it will defeat the supposed benefit of setting rate levels
below costs. If this real cost increase is not permitted to affect rates in the first
instance, the cycle renews itself, with the capital markets reacting to still another
regulatory action restricting the return and increasing risk.
Knowledgeable and responsible regulators are fully aware of these realities.
When regulators are permitted to function, public utility regulation limits the
investor to an appropriate return without producing the destructive effects of
confiscatory regulation. Thus, the inherent dynamics of the public utility system
operating as part of a capitalistic society exert, over time, heavy pressure in the
direction of responsible decisionmaking. For this reason, judicial action
requiring compensatory rates follows the logical flow of events. The typical
effect of judicial action when it does come into play is that sensible regulators

are compelled to do what they know is necessary in the public interest.
However, the political process may impede responsible decisionmaking. As
stressed by Professor Pierce, the mass of voters, who know little about the
sophisticated system of public utility regulation, may be manipulated by symbols
designed to stimulate hostility toward the companies. Public utilities can then
become "easy and safe targets for opportunistic behavior by the majority and for
exploitation by politicians. "77 This kind of manipulation has led to breakdowns
in the system. It is also true that the system has withstood these pressures in
countless cases.
As long as there is a perceived likelihood that the courts in enforcing the
Constitution will take timely and effective action to counteract confiscatory
decisions, the arguments of responsible participants in the political debate will
be reinforced. Then, irresponsible participants arguing for confiscatory
regulation will be faced with two mutually supporting obstacles: the threat of
constitutional enforcement and the influence of the capital markets. For nearly
a hundred years, this combination has been successful in a wide range of
situations-through prosperity, inflation, and depression. On the other hand,
where timely and effective constitutional enforcement disappeared as a practical
matter, the outcome has been disastrous. 78 Professor Pierce's own paper
substantiates this conclusion. 79
The interrelated nature of constitutional principles and capital market reaction
means that effective enforcement of these principles would not create the
immense burdens and complications outlined by Professor Pierce. Long
experience with utility regulation indicates that, if the courts act in a firm and
timely way, respect for the Constitution and protection of the public interest can

77. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2048.
78. Timeliness ofjudicial action against confiscation is central to its effectiveness. As indicated
by the bitter dispute among the judges about "mere' procedure reflected in Jersey Central, if a
reviewing court postpones action until every possible procedural nicety is taken care of, this may be

tantamount to denying protection.
79. See supra Section I.
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be maintained with a relatively modest dedication of judicial resources. Again,
Professor Pierce's own essay confirms this point. He recounts the relative
inactivity of the federal judiciary over the last forty years-a period during which
public utility regulation escaped the kind of public policy catastrophe reflected
in the Bronx Ruin. 80 Nonetheless, Professor Pierce would prefer the federal
judiciary to return to its prior inactivity with respect to claims of confiscatory
regulation. This Article responds by pointing out that his own statement of
recent history indicates the need for effective and timely enforcement of longestablished constitutional standards.
When reconciling these contrasting points of view, a key consideration is how
any alternative would affect the Supreme Court's mission. Sound jurisprudence
recognizes that the federal judiciary, and most of all the Supreme Court, should
not be swamped by trivial cases.8' The Court today has virtually complete
discretion in controlling its agenda.82 Its challenge is to employ this discretion
by focusing its resources to ensure that the most critical and urgent matters
receive due attention.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court applies various levels of scrutiny.8 As
discussed above, the federal courts afford immense deference to non-judicial
government in the case of economic regulation of non-utilities. On the other
hand, since public utilities are so vulnerable to arbitrary action of government,
and the services that utilities provide are so critical to the functioning of society
as a whole, a higher level of scrutiny is applied-as confirmed by Duquesne Light.
If one assumes, as implied by Professor Pierce's essay, that every case of
alleged confiscatory regulation of a public utility would have to be exhaustively
litigated, the burden on the courts would be formidable. But the great majority
of issues in cases involving state regulation are resolved at the state level. An
important factor leading to this result is the Johnson Act of 1934, which closed
84
off the lower federal courts to utilities claiming confiscatory state action.
Furthermore, agency, utility, and reviewing courts are united by a common
interest in maintaining a favorable position of the enterprise vis-A-vis the capital
markets, for all the reasons discussed above. It is this felicitous combination of
interests that has permitted the system of utility regulation to function
reasonably well in preventing confiscation, with one critical proviso: provided the
judiciaryrequiresgovernment to comprehendand respect the dynamics ofthe system.
The last forty years demonstrate that this can be accomplished with a fairly light
commitment of Supreme Court resources, so long as there is timely action by
lower courts applying the keystone principles to living enterprises functioning as

80.
81.

See supra note 74.
See generally KomesarA Jobfor the Judges: The Judiciayand the Constitutionin a Massive

and Complex Society, 86 MiCH. L REv. 657 (1988).
82. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1988).
83. See supra note 58.
84.

Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
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part of a dynamic system. However, where the judiciary fails to carry out its
role, the system fails, and society suffers grave consequences. This is precisely
what Professor
Pierce illustrates through his grim history of confiscatory
s
decisions.

V. REFORMS INITIATED BY THE FCC AND THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION
Professor Pierce's position is comprised of a number of self-contradictory
elements. Finding ambiguity in Duquesne Light as well as Hope, he claims the
Supreme Court's explicit statements of constitutional doctrine should not be
taken at face value; rather, he assumes a sub rosa doctrine of near-absolute
deference. He presents a persuasive case showing confiscatory action on a
massive scale with grave consequences, and argues that this danger is an

85. Why did the nuclear power plant fiasco described by Professor Pierce occur? This is a
complex question beyond the scope of this Article and the expertise of its authors. We can only
suggest that public utility regulation is designed to function in a reasonably predictable world of
modest incremental changes and relatively low risk. It is this low risk that justifies a reasonably
limited return. See, a., Justice Brandeis' seminal concurring opinion in the Southwestern Bell case,
Missouri ex reL Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276,289
(1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.):
To give to capital embarked in public utilities the protection guaranteed by the
Constitution, and to secure for the public reasonable rates, it is essential that the rate
base be definite, stable, and readily ascertainable....
in "speculative enterprises the capital cost of money is always high.... It is to the
interest both of the utility and of the community that the capital be obtained at as low
a cost as possible.
lia at 292, 307.
The decades-long controversy over the desirability of nuclear power plants has introduced dramatic
increases in investor risk because:
(1) The construction of nuclear power plants involved vast undertakings making use of advanced
technology and implemented over long periods of time; and, during construction, government safety
standards and policies kept changing, thereby further extending construction and increasing cost.
Inevitably, under these circumstances, a hostile review of management performance produced arguable
failures that could form a basis for penalties.
(2) Federallstate policy conflict led to state and local government action denying the cooperation
which is indispensable to obtaining a federal operating license; and then, regulatory action under
intense political pressure denied recovery of invested capital based on the fact that a federal operating
license had not been obtained.
(3) Judicial intervention was postponed to a stage far too late to exercise any constructive
influence. See Jersey Central, 810 F.2d 1168; Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370
(N.D.N.Y 1987); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387 (F.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'4 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
The regulated enterprise is able to present to the capital markets an investment option that is
competitive with other available options so long as the relatively low risk associated with that
enterprise offsets the regulatory limits that restrict its return. Conservative investors will accept
reasonably limited returns where risk is perceived to be low. Adventurous investors will accept higher
risk for the sake of a generous return. But an investment option that-in comparison with other
available options-is perceived to combine high risk and low return is not competitive, and the capital
markets will not pursue that option unless it is improved by some combination of better return or
lower risk.
The pattern of confiscatory regulation discussed in Professor Pierce's essay simultaneously limited
the utility's return while dramatically increasing risk. He correctly concludes future ratepayers will
bear higher capital costs because of the increased risk associated with this type of investment.
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important risk necessarily associated with utility regulation. He then insists that
the public interest requires the federal judiciary to return to a generally inactive
role. Finally, his article overstates the difficulties of applying the Constitution
by not recognizing the mutual reinforcement of constitutional doctrine and
capital market influence.
The political malfunction he describes should lead to a different recommendation. The solution is reform of the regulatory process to correct its deficiencies-but reform that operates in harmony with constitutional principles. This
subject will be addressed below in the context of regulatory initiatives in the field
of telecommunications.
The FCC and California commission are pursuing innovative approaches to
regulation that respect constitutional principles. Enlightened federal and state
regulators are now addressing regulatory reform. Illustrations are available
which demonstrate how the drawbacks of utility regulation can be dealt with
through reforms that recognize constitutional principles. Plans developed by the
FCC and by the California commission are designed to attain this result.
While public utility regulation, properly applied, has served the purpose of
preventing both confiscatory regulation and excessive returns, the system suffers
from a number of recognized deficiencies. Professor Pierce, the FCC, and the
California commission have discussed the same essential drawbacks of conventional public utility regulation.8 Conventional regulation suppresses the
dynamic process that produces socially beneficial results in a competitive
environment, and actually discourages the regulated firm from behaving in a
socially beneficial way. Conventional regulation creates distorted incentives that
reward inefficient operation. For example, it provides short term incentives to
increase plant investment, rather than promoting efficient use of existing
company facilities. Where the firm provides a variety of services, and some of
those services are more competitive than others, conventional regulation raises
intractable problems of cost allocation and cross-subsidy. Finally, such
regulation may produce perverse incentives that discourage innovationY
The plans developed by the FCCss and the California commission are each
86.

See Pierce,supranote 1,at 2058-61; Report& Order,4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2889-2913; California

Interim Opinion, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 46-69.

87.

See Report and Order,4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2889-92.

88. In principle, the FCC's price caps plan for Local Exchange Carriers CLECs!D, see Report
& Order, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2893-96, works this way.
(1)
A carrier's services are grouped together in accordance with common characteristics.
(2)
Certain limits ("price caps") are established at the outset on the firm's pricing for

appropriate groupings of services.
(3)
The weighted prices in each grouping are adjusted annually pursuant to formulas designed
to reflect changes in the carrier's input costs, with changes measured with reference to the Gross

National Product Price Index ('GNP-Pr') because this "recognized, government-administered index
...

reflects broad-based input cost changes experienced by dominant carriers more accurately than

the more commonly known Consumer Price Index." Id at 2893-94.
(4)
Based on industry experience, included in the formula is a productivity factor, so that the
formula will exert constant downward pressure on rates.
(5)
Provision is made for adjusting rates to reflect specified kinds of costs that are beyond a
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designed to avoid these unfortunate effects.89 In each case, a carrier's rates as
they exist at the outset of the plan may be adjusted annually by a mechanism
keyed to the Gross National Product Price Index ("GNP-PI")9° and historic
annual productivity improvement in the exchange carrier industry. Furthermore,
there is a provision for sharing these consequences among ratepayers and
investors in the event that actual results prove to be more or less favorable than
intended. Also, should exogenous changes develop,91 there are provisions
enabling the commission to reflect the impact of these changes in the carrier's
rates. These plans are designed to (i) facilitate rate reductions year by year, and
(ii) replace the perverse incentives of conventional regulation with a set of
constructive incentives that will reward rather than punish the regulated firm for
conduct that better serves the public interest.
It is important to note how the FCC and the California commission plans-in
contrast with Professor Pierce's approach-make explicit provision for compliance with constitutional standards. The FCC declares that its incentive plan is
designed to operate in harmony with the coterminous statutory and constitutional standard reflected in the Communications Act. 92 Emphasizing the broad

carrier's direct control.
In a nutshell, the price caps plan the FCC has implemented for AT&T, and is moving to implement
for LECs starting in 1991, not only holds the line on prices, it pressures the firm to reduce prices over
time in accordance with historic industry improvements in productivity.
After the preparation of this Article, the FCC adopted a plan for LECs comporting with the
foregoing description, with an added feature that contemplates a sharing with the ratepayer of LEC
profitability beyond a specified level. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers,
Second Report and Order, No. 87-313 (F.C.C., adopted Sept. 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Fedcom library,
FCC file).
One must expect that in any case the plan will be appealed to the courts. For the view that the
FCC's plan is likely to be upheld on appeal, see Ghosh, The Futureof FCCDominant CarrierRate
Regulation: 7he Price Cap Scheme, 41 FED. CoMM. LJ. 401, 430 (1989).
89. The California plan only applies to the two largest LECs in California, Pacific Bell and
GTE California Incorporated. The plan, which went into effect in January 1990, is a modified "price
caps" approach that constrains the LECs' profits through annual rate updates coupled with a sharing
mechanism. CaliforniaInterim Opinion, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (FUR) at 13-15.
The regulatory framework of the plan is centered around a price cap indexing mechanism with
sharing of excess earnings above a benchmark rate of return level. For pricing purposes, the LECs'
services are divided into three categories: Category I embraces "basic monopoly' services, and their
rates can be changed only with commission approval; Category II embraces services that are either
discretionary or partially competitive, and the plan provides the LEC with downward pricing flexibility
as to these services; Category III services-consisting of computer-enhanced services, Yellow Page
directory advertising services, inside wiring services, and other services found to be fully competitive-enjoy the maximum pricing flexibility allowed by law. Id
90. The GNP-PI is one of a number of GNP-based price indices published by the United
States Department of Commerce. It "utilizes an historical base period (currently 1982), and
summarizes price changes in all sectors of the economy... " FurtherNotice, 3 F.C.C. Red. at 3390.
91. Such exogenous changes, i.e., beyond a carrier's direct control, could include government
action altering the Uniform System of Accounts or altering the Separations Manual (separating costs
related to intrastate service, regulated by the states, from those related to interstate service, regulated
by the FCC). See Report & Order,4 F.C.C. Red. at 3188-90. See also CaliforniaInterim Opinion, 107
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 14.
92. The Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988). See id, §§ 201(b), 202(a).
See generally FurtherNotice, 3 F.C.C Red. at 3294-3306 (the FCC's discussion of legal authority).
Addressing the coterminous "justand reasonable" standard, see supra note 43, the FCC states: "courts
evaluate whether the end results of particular regulatory schemes produce rates that fall within a 'zone
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discretion granted to a rate-regulating agency under Hope's end result test, 93the
FCC describes its plan as "moored to the statutory scheme."9 The FCC
maintains it is not departing from the statutory mandate, but merely seeking a
better way to execute that mandate.
There is similar respect for constitutional principles reflected in the California
plan, which is designed to comply with the requirements of state and federal
statutes and constitutions. 95 "[Tihe adopted regulatory framework allows [the
LECs] a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return on their
investments and thus is not confiscatory."96 This opportunity is provided
inasmuch as the plan "indexes rates for basic monopoly services and rate caps for
flexibly priced services by the GNP-PI offset by a productivity target."97 "With
the protection of additional adjustments for exogenous factors," the California
commission concludes, "this indexing approach will provide a reasonable estimate
of revenues needed to compensate the utilities for their costs of providing these
services."9 Moreover, recognizing that the plan might result in "greater
variability in earnings than under the traditional rate-of-return approach," the
commission has "determined that the market-based rate of return is somewhat
above that which would have been reasonable under traditional ratemaking."99
Taking this point one step further, the California commission-observing "that
the adopted productivity adjustment is a 'stretch' target"-has said it will
prescribe "a benchmark rate of return somewhat above the market-based rate of
return."1'0 Accordingly, the California commission decided that:
[TIhe utilities may keep all earnings from basic monopoly, flexibly
priced, directory advertising, and inside wiring services up to that
level if they meet and exceed the productivity target, and may further
retain 10half
of any earnings above the benchmark rate of return up to
1
a cap.
"This balanced regulatory package," the California commission maintains,

of reasonableness'." IM at 3297 & n.351 (citing Pennzoil, 439 U.S. at 517; Jersey Central, 810 F.2d at
1168; AT&T, 836 F.2d at 1386). "For rates to fall within the zone of reasonableness," the FCC

continues, "the agency rate order must constitute a 'reasonable balancing' of the 'investor interest in
maintaining financial integrity and access to capital markets and the consumer interest in being
charged non-exploitative rates."' Id at 3297 & n.352 (citing Jersey Central, 810 F.2d at 1177-78;
Pennzoil, 439 U.S. at 517).
93. See supra note 43.
94. Further iotce, 3 F.C.C. Red. at 3300.
95.
96.

See CaliforniaInterim Opinion, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 164-68.
Id at 167.

97.

Id at 166.

98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 166-67.

101. Id at 167.
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provides the LECs "not only with a reasonable opportunity to earn a reasonable

rate of return on these services but also with an opportunity to earn returns
above market levels if they cut costs and otherwise respond to efficiency
incentives in the new framework.ul 2 With periodic reviews to allow reflection
in rates of productivity trends in a timely fashion, the agency concludes that its
plan "is likely to be more effective than the current general rate case approach
in maintaining reasonable and stable rates for basic telecommunications
services."1t 3
As the forgoing discussion shows, the plans adopted by the FCC and California
commission are designed to work in harmony with coterminous statutory
requirements and constitutional principles.
CONCLUSION

This Article challenges Professor Pierce's treatment of constitutional principles
governing public utility regulation. As recently as the 1989 Duquesne Light case,
the United States Supreme Court has carefully articulated these principles. 1The
Constitution protects the utility from the net effect of the rate order on its
property."104 The guiding principle is that "the Constitution protects utilities
from being limited to a charge0for their property serving the public which is so
'unjust' as to be confiscatory."' 5 Thus, where state action is involved, "[if the
rate does not afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use of
utility property without paying just compensation and so violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments."1°6 These explicit statements of constitutional
doctrine negate Professor Pierce's suggestion that the Court's intent
is to allocate
07
to political institutions "near total power" regarding ratesetting.
Furthermore, the pattern of confiscatory regulation recounted by Professor
Pierce underscores the need for this doctrine, and for its timely and effective
application. He is quite correct in stressing the risk that a politicized environment may cause confiscation, and in highlighting the destructive consequences
of confiscatory regulation. However, his article fails to recognize that many
decades of experience show how the successful interplay of capital market
influence and timely judicial action can prevent confiscation. These considerations should lead not to judicial abdication, but to greater emphasis on assuring
compliance with the Constitution.
Finally, the regulatory reforms being implemented in the telecommunications
industry by the FCC and the California commission show that the recognized
shortcomings of public utility regulation can be dealt with effectively through

102. I4 (emphasis in original).
103. Id.

104. Duque.sm Light 109 S. Ct. at 619.
105. Id at 615.
106. Id at 616.
107. Pierce, supra note 1, at 2046.
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policies operating in harmony with the constitutional principles established and
consistently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
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POSTSCRIPT

A Synopsis of ProfessorPierce'sArticle"
In Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police
PoliticalInstitutions?,- Professor Pierce argues that reinvigorated judicial review
of the constitutionality of utility rate decisions offers little promise of improved
performance of regulated industries. Professor Pierce begins by surveying the
applicable precedents. He characterizes the Supreme Court's 1944 opinion in
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas~ as establishing a vague and
ambiguous standard of constitutionality that is difficult to apply. From the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in state utility rate cases in the forty years
following its opinion in Hope, Professor Pierce draws the inference that Hope
represented a de facto withdrawal from the judiciary's prior attempts to enforce
the Just Compensation Clause in the utility regulatory context. Professor Pierce
notes several recent developments, however, that suggest the Court is now
considering reentry into the business of constraining state utility regulation
through meaningful judicial application of the Just Compensation Clause. He
devotes the rest of the article in an attempt to answer the question whether
renewed judicial involvement is justified by recent trends in state utility
ratemaking.
Professor Pierce suggests a test to determine whether aggressive judicial
enforcement of a constitutional constraint on politically accountable institutions
is justified, given the limited institutional competence and resources of the
Judicial Branch. According to Professor Pierce, the judiciary should become
actively involved in constraining government conduct when: (i) there is evidence
of a serious political malfunction in some important area of government action;
and (ii) there is reason to believe that the judiciary can correct or curb that
malfunction at tolerable costs with scarce judicial resources and with a tolerably
low risk of judicial errors. Based on an empirical analysis of state electric utility
rate decisions from 1984 through 1989, Professor Pierce concludes that this
important area of government decisionmaking has been afflicted by the serious
political malfunction of majoritarian bias. State regulators have engaged in
massive opportunistic "takings" of utility capital investments in response to
populist antipathy toward proposed rate increases. Moreover, this systematic
pattern of behavior has created an environment in which utilities are unwilling
to make the capital investments necessary to assure that the nation will have an
adequate supply of electricity in the future.
Turning to the second part of his proposed test, however, Professor Pierce

*

Professor Pierce authored the Synopsis of his Article.
Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciatyAttempt to Police Political
Institutions?, 77 GEo. LJ. 2031 (1989).
*** Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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reluctantly concludes that the judiciary is ill-equipped to constrain state
regulators from "taking" utility property through the ratemaking process. He
notes that regulators have employed three different doctrines in the process of
"taking" scores of billions of dollars from utilities. He argues that these three
doctrines have a high degree of functional interchangeability. Thus, the courts
cannot expect to limit state regulatory discretion to "take" utility property unless
they are able to enforce effective limits on the power of state agencies to apply
all three doctrines. Given the technical complexity of utility ratemaking and the
critical role played by agency findings of unverifiable and elusive "facts,"
Professor Pierce expresses great doubt that the federal judiciary is capable of
such a daunting task. Moreover, he expresses concern that judges are likely to
introduce new sources of distortion into the regulatory system because of their
limited ability to understand the complicated ways in which utility ratemaking
doctrines interact.
Professor Pierce tempers the pessimism evident in the text of his article by
adding an optimistic concluding hypothesis. He notes that electric utility
ratemaking was afflicted with the political malfunction of minoritarian bias
during the 1950s and 1960s. Utilities were able to use the complicated state
regulatory process to "take" property from consumers by exploiting their power
as ineffectively regulated monopolies. Pierce links that systematic utility success
in the state regulatory process with electric utilities' traditional adamant
opposition to all legislative and regulatory efforts to permit competition in the
electricity market. The recent pattern of state victimization of electric utilities
has caused many firms to reevaluate their position on the merits of competition
versus regulation. Many utilities have become more willing to accept competition in the wholesale electricity market in return for some degree of insulation
from the threat of opportunistic regulatory takings by state agencies. This
change in attitude by electric utilities has had the salutary effect of increasing the
political viability of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's proposals to
restructure regulation of the industry to allow market forces to displace
regulation as the primary determinant of the price of electricity.
B ProfessorPierce'sComments
The authors of this Article sent a draft to Professor Pierce asking for his
comments. He responded with a very courteous letter, which in relevant part is
quoted below:
Thank you for favoring me with a copy of your manuscript. I am
flattered that you considered my article worthy of response, and I
think your response will be a worthy contribution to the dialogue in
this important area. I found nothing "unfair" or "inaccurate" in your
response, but I will accept your invitation to make a few comments.
I was a bit surprised at your characterization of my position [at
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page 86] as "insisting" utility investors be denied constitutional
protection. The characterization is not inaccurate, but I hoped to
convey more a flavor of reluctant acquiescence in the extremely
limited ability of the courts to perform this theoretically desirable
function.
[Y]ou note accurately [at page 85] that the electric utility industry
is financially healthy as a whole. Unfortunately, this is true only
because electric utilities have ceased making any significant investments in assets that are subject to state regulation. That is not a very
socially desirable route to financial health.
[Y]ou note [at page 86] that hundreds of state courts have cited
and applied Hope and Bluefield. Your reference to state court review
Mfils
an unfortunate gap in my article. I left the gap, however, largely
because I do not share your faith in state courts when exogenous
factors threaten very large rate increases. I have encountered only a
couple of cases in which state courts have reversed or remanded state
agency decisions disallowing investments in new generating plants.
State courts have contributed to the problem of regulatory takings
from investors to a greater extent than they have protected investors
from regulators. Consider, for instance, the decisions of the Supreme
Courts of Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Ohio that required state
PUCs to disallow investments the PUCs had attempted to allow.-The troublesome phenomenon I describe arises only when exogenous
forces create large cost increases. When that happens, however, as
it can in any regulated industry, most state courts are unlikely to
provide investor protection from populist wrath.
[Y]ou attach considerable significance to [Duquesne Light]....
Why should we take [DuquesneLight] seriously when the court denies
cert. in all of the large dollar cases, e.g., Public Service of New
Hampshire and the two big Ohio cases?***** Once Lewis Powell
left, I think the Court lost its enthusiasm to enter this area. Powell
was the'only Justice pushing hard to get the Court back in the fray.
Also, what can the courts do about the scores of cases in which state
PUCs disallow investments based on disingenuous findings of
imprudence? [Duquesne Light] does not address that part of the
problem at all.
fflou discuss Jersey Central and AT&T [at page 87] We simply

**** The cases Professor Pierce had in mind were: (i) Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.

Comm'n, 516 Pa. 142, 532 A.2d 325 (1987); (ii) Mississippi ex rel Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978 (Miss. 1987); (iii) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67
Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), appealdismissed, 455 U.S. 914 (1983).
*
The cases Professor Pierce had in mind were: (i) In re Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire, 130 N.H. 265, 539 A.2d 263 (1988), appeal dismissed, 109 S. CL 858 (1989); (ii)
Cleveland Elec. illuminating Co. v. Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 3d 107, 447 N.E.2d 746,
appeal divnissed,464 U.S. 802 (1983); and (iii) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n,
67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 914 (1982).
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disagree on the proper characterization of those opinions. I agree
completely with your discussion of capital markets [at pages 92-95].
Finally, [at pages 96-100] you discuss price caps. You probably
will not like my skeptical treatment of price caps in the enclosed
article. It will be published soon in Northwestern Law Review, along
with a response by Hillman and Breautigam.
Thanks again for giving me the opportunity to comment on your
manuscript.
C. Response to ProfessorPierce'sComments
The questions about the risks and uncertainties of price caps regulation
Professor Pierce raises in his letter and his article, Price Level Regulation Based
on Inflation is not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation,... are
well taken. By no means was it the intent of this Article to present the price
caps concept as a panacea. Only time will tell whether alternative approaches
to regulation such as price caps will prove to be effective in controlling rates
while assuring the utility a reasonable opportunity to recover its costs, including
the cost of capital.
For all of its faults, the current system of regulation has provided telephone
companies with a considerable degree of protection from confiscation. The
essential point of this Article is that any alternative system should be crafted to
continue and improve this protection. The authors believe that this can be
accomplished. The FCC and California plans illustrate how this might be
approached.
No doubt the authors are influenced by their experience representing
telephone companies. The telephone industry has not had to face the massive
confiscation of investment that has afflicted power companies in connection with
nuclear plants. In view of this relatively good experience with conventional
regulation over a long period of time, it is very significant that the telephone
industry has been, by and large, more than willing to support the FCC's price
caps proposal and similar initiatives at the state level. The recognized
deficiencies of the current system of regulating rates make alternative regulation
attractive. Not only does the current system tolerate economic inefficiencies, its
built-in perverse incentives stimulate inefficiencies. Facing ever-increasing
competition, telephone company management is trying to escape from this kind
of regulation. Consequently, telephone companies are willing to face the
uncertainties of "incentive regulation." In the months and years to come, the
outcome of this virtually nationwide experiment will emerge from the fire of
actual experience.
*****Pierce, Prke Level Regulation Based on Inflation is not an Attractive Alternative to Profit
Level Regulation, 84 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 665 (1990). See also HUman & Braeutigam, The Potential
Benefits and Problemsof PriceLevel Regulation: A More Hopefid Perspective,84 Nw. U.L. REv. 695

(1990).
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